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THE MICHIGAN JUVENILE WAIVER PACKAGE: AN ANALYSIS OF
ITS USE IN WAYNE COUNTY, MICHIGAN
Kenneth C.Jackson, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1994
On October 1, 1988, the Michigan Juvenile Waiver Package took
effect in Michigan. One of the results of this was the implementation of
the prosecutorial waiver method in Michigan. Whereas previously
juveniles could only be waived and tried in the adult court via a judicial
waiver, now it was possible for the prosecutor to waive juveniles aged 15
or 16 if charged with one or more of seven specified Class lA felonies.
Data were collected for all youth subject to prosecutorial waiver in Wayne
County over a five year period, from October 1, 1988 through October 1,
1993.Data included: date of waiver; age, race, and sex of the juvenile; the
offense charged; and the outcome of the waiver trial. It was found that
over half of the juveniles waived to the adult court were returned to the
juvenile justice system for sentencing after conviction. This was
unexpected, as one of the goals of the waiver law was harsher punishment
for serious, violent youth. In summary, the prosecutorial waiver law in
Michigan appears to serve more of a symbolic function than an
instrumental one.
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CHAPTER!
INTRODUCTION
For almost one hundred years, since the creation of the first
juvenile court in Chicago, Illinois, children have been subject to a different
justice system than adults. The differential treatment of offenders based
on age however, dates back much further than this, to four thousand years
ago. The justice system for youth is not only physically separate from the
adult justice system, but also ideologically and philosophically different. It
is guided by the assumption that the youths subject to it are in need of
guidance and supervision and can be rehabilitated, that the problems that
brought them to the attention of the court can be corrected (Platt, 1977).
While the rehabilitative philosophy of the juvenile court is in direct
contrast to the punitive and retributive philosophy of the criminal court,
. there has been since the court's creation a way to subject its clientele to
the adult court. The waiver, or transfer, of jurisdiction is typically
reserved for a small number of youths, not intended for the majority of
juvenile court clientele. Traditionally, waiver has been justified as
providing greater protection for the general public than the juvenile court
can, by removing from the community youth who are dangerous and
intractable or those who have exhausted the rehabilitative resources
within the juvenile court (Bortner, 1986). The oldest and most prevalent
method to transfer jurisdiction is the judicial waiver, by which a juvenile
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court judge relinquishes the court's jurisdiction over a youth in order for
the criminal court to initiate proceedings against him or her (Feld, 1984).
In recent years, the underlying philosophy of the juvenile justice
system has been criticized and challenged. The rehabilitative ideals of the
juvenile court have suffered from a loss of public confidence due to a
systematic increase in the amount of serious, chronic, and violent juvenile
crime, and the apparent leniency of the courts in dealing with these
offenders (Champion, 1989). As a result, the concern for the best interests
of the child has been replaced with a need for greater public protection,
with punishment and retribution becoming more prominent (Bortner,
1986). One result of this philosophical shift has been a change in the
juvenile court's jurisdiction and sentencing policies across the nation.
Since 1978, over 40 states have passed laws reflective of this change, all of
which have restricted the once exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
juvenile court (Feld, 1987).
The two primary methods by which states have narrow�d juvenile
court jurisdiction are through the legislative waiver and the prosecutorial
waiver. Those states with legislative waiver, or legislative offense
exclusion, mandate that youth with stated age, offense, and prior record
restrictions be tried automatically in the criminal court. In these cases the
juvenile court does not have original jurisdiction, the youth is legislatively
excluded from it. The second method is the prosecutorial waiver, in which
the prosecutor, also restricted by age, offense, and past record
requirements, is allowed to determine judicial forum by filing the
appropriate papers in the respective court (Feld, 1987).
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According to Braithewaite and Shore (1981), the waiver of
jurisdiction for juvenile offenders to the criminal court is the most serious
disposition available to the juvenile court. Zimring (1981) equates the
waiver of juveniles to capital punishment, in that both share low
incidence, are discretionary, ultimate, and inconsistent with the
underlying philosophy of the respective court. Feld (1987) states that it
represents a choice between the rehabilitative philosophy of the juvenile
court and the punitive philosophy of the criminal court. It is also
indicative of the juvenile court's recognition that the youth is incompatible
with the rehabilitative dispositions available to him or her in the juvenile
court, and is deserving of punishment (Braithewaite & Shore, 1981).
The predominant rationale for allowing the transfer of juveniles to
criminal courts has been that particular juveniles, by virtue of their
behavior and criminal activity, are not deserving of the protection afforded
by their juvenile status. Hence, the waiver is justified as protecting the
public, by identifying and incapacitating those juveniles deemed as
dangerous and intractable (Bortner, 1986). Accordingly, the waiver is used
when the crime is particularly heinous and the minimum length of
confinement exceeds the maximum length available under the juvenile
justice system (Feld, 1984).

In recent years, the use of waiver has

increased significantly in most states. An analysis of trends in waiver
statutes indicates that hearings are now being used more often in order
for officials to impose more serious punishment on juveniles charged with
serious crimes than is possible in the juvenile court (Champion, 1989).
This is due to the gradual replacement of the rehabilitation philosophy
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with one of just deserts, a result of the public's criticism of juvenile court
processing and its apparent leniency toward youth (Champion, 1989; Feld,
1987).
This thesis will have as its focus the Michigan Juvenile Waiver
Package that took effect on October 1, 1988. A history of the juvenile court
and the philosophy of the juvenile justice system will first be presented,
followed by the changes that have taken place since its creation, to allow
an understanding of the juvenile court today. Various waiver mechanisms
presently in use, which include judicial, legislative and prosecutorial, will
then be examined. The 13 public acts referred to as the Juvenile Waiver
Package of Michigan will then be discussed, along with the rationale
behind and implications of the law. Following a review of the relevant
literature, the research objectives and methods will be stated, aand the
results of this research will be presented. This thesis will end with a
summary of the results and a brief discussion of the implications.
History of the Juvenile Court
The earliest distinctions made between juveniles and adults can be
traced back four thousand years to the Code of Hammurabi and early
Hebrew law, which recognized runaways and children who disowned their
parents (Thomas & Bilchik, 1985). Two thousand years ago Roman civil
law made a distinction between juveniles and adults based on an "age of
responsibility". The Twelve Tables of Roman law specified that juveniles
were to be held criminally responsible for violations of the law, but
specified a less severe punishment. For example, whereas adults convicted
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of theft were subject to flogging, juveniles were ordered to pay restitution.
Eventually Roman law recognized three different stages of childhood,
classifying juveniles as infans, proximus infantiae, or proximus pubertati.

Infans were not held criminally responsible, youth determined to be
proximus pubertati were held criminally responsible, and youth deemed
proximus infantiae could be classified either way (Cox & Conrad, 1991).
Later, in the fifth century A.D. the legal onset of puberty was the point at
which criminal responsibility was applied. This was defined as occurring
at age fourteen for boys and age twelve for girls. Boys between ages seven
and fourteen and girls between ages seven and twelve had criminal
responsibility based on their capacity to understand the difference
between right and wrong, and children below age seven were not held
criminally responsible (Cox & Conrad, 1991).
In English criminal courts, in the eleventh and twelfth centuries,
juveniles were defmed as a special category of people, and infancy or
immaturity was an acceptable legal defense. Recognition was given to the
possibility that courts could (and should) excuse the conduct of those
people who did not (or could not) appreciate the wrongfulness of their
actions. Influenced by Roman law, common law stated that children under
the age of seven were doli incapax, lacking criminal capacity. From ages
seven to fourteen a rebuttable presumption of this criminal incapacity
existed, and infancy or immaturity as a legal defense could be denied. The
crucial part in determining whether a juvenile was held criminally
responsible rested on their capability of forming criminal intent, mens rea,
which had to be proven as existent in order to convict a juvenile if under
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the age of fourteen. Juveniles over the age of fourteen had no right to use
infancy or immaturity as a legal defense, and were presumed doli capax,
having criminal capacity (Cox & Conrad, 1991; Thomas & Bilchik, 1985).
The Chancery Courts of England, created in 1874, contributed two
important components of the modern juvenile court. First, it was in the
Chancery Courts that the king was given the opportunity to exercise the
right of parens patriae (state as father), by allowing the court to act in loco

parentis (in place of the parents), for benefit of children (Cox & Conrad,
1991). Second, these courts lacked the formality and rigidity that had
been characteristic of other English Courts (Thomas & Bilchik, 1985).
These two contributions can be seen in the juvenile court, as it is informal,
-·

with a focus on individualized needs and rehabilitation. English Common
Law allowed for lenient treatment of juveniles based on age, yet this was
not guaranteed for youth above the age of seven '. Juveniles were still sent
to adult prisons; although they were often physically separated from
adults. This was the case until 1788, when Robert Young established the
first private institution specifically for juveniles, with the goal of
preventing them from entering a life of criminality (Conrad & Cox, 1991).
Due primarily to the impact of English Common Law, early
American legal documents took into account the age of t�ose alleged to
have violated the law. The changes that led to the eventual creation of the
juvenile court are also associated with the establishment of houses of
refuge in Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania between 1824 and
1828. These houses of refuge were the first public facilities established
exclusively for the care of juveniles. It was here that the origins of the
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juvenile justice system planted its roots, separating juveniles from adults
in the court and in penal institutions (Thomas & Bilchik, 1985).
In the late 1800s, there was a great deal of change in the social and
economic structure of the United States. The existence of the railroad
industry enhanced economic growth and changed manufacturing
processes, which in turn increased urbanization and ,immigration. The
family was modernized, which resulted in a different cultural conception
of childhood. This meant that for an increasing number of youths, their
social development took place in an urban industrial society, instead of
occurring in a rural agrarian one. With this came new social problems,
such as "brothels, alcohol, comic books, amusement parks, and other
commercialized vices" which "were seen as a ubiquitous threat to the
fragility of youth" (Platt, 1977: p. 91). As a response to these new social
problems, the Progressive movement emerged. Children were perceived as
corruptible innocents, and the family, specifically women, assumed a
greater role in supervising their moral and social development (Feld,
1987). The Progressives introduced a number of reforms to the criminal
justice system, including probation, parole, indeterminate sentencing, and
finally the juvenile court. These changes shared common elements, all
being flexible and discretionary, with the goal of rehabilitation.
As a result of both the Progressive movement and the earlier efforts
at separating children from adults, the Illinois legislature in 1899 passed
"an act to regulate the treatment and control of dependent, neglected, and
delinquent children" (Revised Laws of illinois, 1899: p. 131-137, as cited in
Platt, 1977). The result of this, the Illinois Juvenile Court Act, was the
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creation of a separate court and justice system for children. Wisconsin
and New York followed Illinois and created their juvenile courts in 1901,
and in 1925 all but two of the 48 states had created juvenile courts
through legislation. By 1945 the reform movement was complete: all
jurisdictions in the country had created some type of juvenile court (Cox &
Conrad, 1991; Platt, 1977).
The Juvenile Court
The intent of the juvenile court movement was to remove children
from the criminal court and provide them with a separate system of
justice with a different underlying philosophy. Under the concept parens
patriae, the juvenile court had as its goal treatment and rehabilitation,
not punishment and retribution as was characteristic of the criminal court
(Mlyniec, 1976). The juvenile court sought to control a variety of behaviors
associated with premature adulthood, behaviors which countered the
normative concept of childhood and adolescence (Feld, 1987). Intervention
by the juvenile court was intended to forestall premature adulthood,
enforce the dependent conditions of youth, and supervise their moral
upbringing (Feld, 1987; Platt, 1977). Whether the behavior in question
was criminal or non criminal was unimportant, as the goal of the juvenile
court was to treat and rehabilitate, not punish, and proceedings were civil,
not criminal, in nature. These behaviors included criminal activities, such
as stealing and assault, as well as non-criminal activities, such as
smoking, sexuality, truancy, and "living a wayward, idle, and dissolute
life" (Feld, 1987: p.476).
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Along with the statutorial separation of juveniles came other
changes. Intended to separate youth from adults in a number of ways, the
juvenile court had different procedures, a .unique vocabulary, and a
physically separate building. The courtroom was modified to look more
like a parlor in the nature of a family conference than a legal setting, the
ultimate goal being that it in no way resembled the criminal court (Platt,
1977). Proceedings against the child were initiated by a petition, juries
and judges were prohibited, and hearings were informal and confidential.
Individual judges were granted large· amounts of discretion, -primarily
concerned with the best interests of the child, with little emphasii;; placed
on the actual criminal act committed. Due process rights granted to adults
in the criminal court were denied, as the proceedings were intended to be
non-adversarial. Dispositions were given to rehabilitate and treat,
intended to deter future delinquency and prevent youth from entering into
a life of crime. Dispositions were non-proportional and indeterminate,
with the court's supervision intended to continue for the duration of the
child's minority (Feld, 1987; Platt, 1977).
According to Flicker (1981), there are three principles that govern
the operation of the juvenile court: parens patriae, individualized justice,
and the best interests of the child. Parens patriae, translated as "state as
father", is derived from the King of the chancery courts of England, as he
assumed the parent or guardian role of all children who needed his
protection. This philosophy was adopted in the United States to justify
commitment of children to institutions, whether it be for the commission
of a criminal act or for abuse or neglect of the child by the parents.
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Individual justice obligates a judge to consider all circumstances of the
relevant case and all the facts in the defendant's history to arrive at the
appropriate disposition. With little focus in the juvenile court on the
actual offense committed, individualized justice allows a judge to exercise
discretion in making a decision, through consideration of any relevant
facts or circumstances unique to each case. The third principle is the best
interests of the child, recited as the governing principle in almost all
juvenile court statutes. The court, acting on behalf of the child by
assuming the role of parent or guardian, is a philanthropic authority
attempting to make decisions and implement dispositions in order to be of
greatest benefit to the child (Flicker, 1981).
Changes inthe Juvenile Court
From the juvenile court's inception, there were criticisms of its
handling of juvenile delinquents. Liberal critics challenged the juvenile
court with respect to the constitutionality of its procedures, policies, and
broad dispositional powers (Thomas & Bilchik, 1985). Public support of
the rehabilitative ideal later suffered due to a rise in the juvenile crime
rate and evidence that the court was not able to achieve its lofty
expectations (Rudman, Hartstone, Fagan, & Moore, 1986). These
criticisms and challenges to the court were futile until the 1960s, when
the United States Supreme Court handed down a series of decisions
regarding juvenile justice.
The first of these cases, Kent v. United States, arose from the
concern that youth were being transferred from the juvenile court to the
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criminal court arbitrarily and capriciously. Upon reviewing the judicial
waiver statute in the District of Columbia, the Court stated that transfer
of jurisdiction was an important and critical stage, and mandated a
number of procedural safeguards to protect the best interests of the child.
The rights that were granted to juveniles included: the right to a hearing
that satisfies due process rights, representation by counsel, access to the
information used in making the waiver decision, and a written statement
of the rationale behind a successful waiver. The Court also established a
number of guidelines to assist judges in making the decision to waive a
youth, listing the following as criteria a judge might consider: seriousness
of the offense, the prosecutorial merit of the case, the sophistication and
merit of the child, the child's prior record, the response of the child to prior
rehabilitation efforts, and dispositional alternatives available to the public
(383 U.S. 541, 1966). The Court's decision was the first of several steps
taken in establishing minimum requirements of law in waiver proceedings
and in the juvenile court.
One year later, in 1967, the Court handed down another decision
that resulted in the most dramatic changes in the juvenile court since its
creation (Feld, 1987). In In Re Gault, the Court reviewed the reasons for
juveniles historically being denied procedural safeguards, and then
rejected them, stating that "unbridled discretion...is frequently a poor
substitute for principle and procedure," and that this often resulted in
arbitrariness rather than "careful, compassionate, individual treatment"
(387 U.S. 13, 1967). Several features of the juvenile justice system were
seen as important and deserving of procedural safeguards. First, the

juvenile was being adjudicated and found delinquent for offenses that
would be considered criminal if committed by an adult. Second was the
stigma attached to a finding of criminality. or delinquency. Finally, if
judged delinquent, there was the possibility of institutional confinement.
For these reasons, especially that of deprivation of liberty, the Court
stated that juveniles had the right to advance notice of the charges
against them, the right to a fair and impartial hearing, the right to
assistance of counsel, and protection against self incrimination. However,
the Court did not intend to make the juvenile court and the criminal court
essentially the same. Accordingly, it limited the application of these
safeguards only to the adjudicatory phase, when the child is judged
delinquent, and not to the intake or disposition stages. The application of
these safeguards to the juvenile court, placing some limitations on the
court's power, was seen as important in order to both determine the truth
and preserve individual freedom (387 U.S. 13, 1967).
Shortly thereafter, In Re Winship again equated juvenile court
proceedings to those of the criminal court. Rejecting the notion that the
juvenile court was a civil system, the Court declared the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process clause to be applicable to the juvenile court, and
stated that delinquency must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt (397
U.S. 358, 1970). Five years later the Court established a functional
equivalence between delinquency proceedings and criminal trials. In
Breed v. Jones, the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth amendment was

found applicable to juvenile proceedings, which prevented the criminal
court from trying youth following adjudication in the juvenile court. Due
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to the anxiety, pressure, and personal strain present in both courts, and
considering the consequences of being found delinquent, the Court felt
that there was little basis to differentiate delinquency proceedings from
traditional criminal trials (421 U.S. 519, 1975). From this point on judicial
forum had to be decided before a petition or complaint was filed, due to
their functional equivalence.
The sum of these cases, in which the Court stated that the simple
status of being a juvenile could not be equated with a total lack of access
to fundamental constitutional rights, resulted in a dramatic change in the
juvenile court, far removing it from the initial court envisioned by its
Progressive creators (Feld, 1987; Mlyniec, 1976). At its inception, the
juvenile court was informal,-individualized, and primarily concerned with
the best interests of the child. By assuring juveniles their due process
rights and granting them procedural safeguards, the Court has shifted its
focus, becoming more formal and concerned with the proof of commission
of a criminal act. While these decisions were not intended to alter the
fundamental character of the juvenile court, the legislative and judicial
changes required to ensure that the juvenile court was harmonious with
Constitutional requirements have contributed to such changes.
Judicial Waiver
The oldest and most prevalent way of transferring jurisdiction,
dating back to the Illinois Juvenile Court, is by judicial waiver (Bishop,
Frazier, & Henretta, 1989). Reflective of the juvenile court, a judge may
transfer jurisdiction after a hearing in which the child's dangerousness
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and amenability to treatment are assessed, and the criminal court is
determined to be the appropriate place for proceedings against the
juvenile (Feld, 1987). Prior to Kent there were no criteria for a judge to
utilize when making this decision and judicial waiver statutes were seen
as broad and standardless grants of discretion (Feld, 1978). In Kent, the
United States Supreme Court provided some substantive criteria on which
to base such decisions, thereby formalizing waiver decisions. While all
states have different criteria to consider for transferring jurisdiction,
specified with varying degrees of precision, most use the Kent criteria in
some form (Feld, 1987).
Just as maximum age of juvenile court jurisdiction varies across
states, so does the minimum age of eligibility for adult prosecution. The
maximum age of juvenile court jurisdiction is typically 17 or 18, with some
states having 16 as the maximum age. The minimum age at which youth
are eligible for waiver ranges from no minimum age requirement, such as
in Arizona, to 16, as in South Carolina. There also exist differences with
regard to offenses which are eligible for waiver. Arizona, the most lenient
state, allows waiver of jurisdiction for any offense, in conjunction with no
minimum age requirement. Some states, such as Indiana, set minimum
age at 14 for any offense, but will allow youth 10 years of age to be waived
if charged with murder. Forty of the fifty states, and the District of
Columbia, have adopted Kent criteria in some form to serve as guidelines;
only ten states have no criteria incorporated into their statutes. The
predominant judicial waiver statute is one with a minimum age
requirement, usually between 14 and 16, a limitation on offenses, typically
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felonies or Class 1 index crimes, and some form of Kent criteria to consider
(Feld, 1987). Class 1 index crimes include criminal homicide, forcible rape,
robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny theft, automobile theft, and
arson. Kent criteria include the seriousness of the offense, the
prosecutorial merit of the case, the sophistication and merit of the youth,
the youth's prior record, the response of the youth to prior rehabilitative
efforts, and the dispositional alternatives available to the public.
Since its creation in Michigan, the juvenile court has allowed for a
judicial waiver of jurisdiction (Duranczyk, H arp, & Minock, 1988). If a
child who has reached the age of 15 years is accused of an act which would
be a felony if committed by an adult, the judge of probate in the county
where the offense is alleged to have been committed may waive
jurisdiction over the juvenile upon motion of the prosecuting attorney
(MCL 712A.4(1)). After the juvenile has been waived, it is legal to try the
youth in the court having general criminal jurisdiction of the offense.
However, before the juvenile court can waive jurisdiction, the judge first
has to determine that there is probable cause to believe that an offense
has been committed that would be a felony if committed by an adult, and
also probable cause to believe that the child subject to waiver committed
the offense. After the court has determined this, it then has to conduct a
waiver hearing to determine if the best interests of both the child and the
public would be served by waiving jurisdiction, and must consider the
following criteria:
a. The prior record and character of the child, his or her physical
and mental maturity, and his or her pattern of living.
b. The seriousness of the offense.

c. Whether the offense is part of a repetitive pattern of offenses
which would lead to one of the following determinations:
1. The child is not amenable to treatment.
2. That despite the child's potential for treatment, the nature of
the child's delinquent behavior is likely to disrupt the
rehabilitation of other children in the treatment program.
d. Whether despite the child's potential for treatment, the nature of
the child's delinquent behavior is likely to render the child
dangerous to the public if released at the age of 19 or 21.
e. Whether the child is more likely to be rehabilitated by the
services and facilities available in adult programs and procedures
than in juvenile programs and procedures.
f. Whether it is in the best interests of the public welfare and the
protection of the public security that the child stand trial as an
adult offender (MCL 712A.4(4)(a)-(0).
After such a hearing, the court then enters a written order, either
granting or denying the motion to waive jurisdiction, stating the facts and
conclusions arrived at to justify the decision made. If the motion for
waiver is granted, this written order must be sent to the court having
general criminal jurisdiction (MCL 712A.4(7)). The youth is then
arraigned on an information filed by the prosecutor in the court of general
criminal jurisdiction, at which point the juvenile court is removed from
the process, the youth legally being an adult. If he or she is subsequently
convicted of the charges sought, the sentence is served in the adult
criminal justice system, the Michigan Department of Corrections.
Legislative Waiver
The second mechanism used to transfer jurisdiction is the
legislative waiver. As the juvenile courts were created in statute, state
legislatures are free to modify their jurisdiction in this way. In redefining
the juvenile court's jurisdiction, state legislatures have either chosen a
legislative exclusion of offenses, the prosecutorial waiver, or a combination
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of both (Bishop, Frazier, & Henretta, 1989). Legislative offense exclusion
is a waiver method whereby, solely on the present offense charged, the
juvenile court is denied jurisdiction of a particular juvenile offender (Feld,
1987). The second form of legislative waiver is the prosecutorial waiver,
where the juvenile court and criminal court have concurrent jurisdiction,
with specified age and offense limitations, and the prosecutor is allowed to
determine judicial forum by filing either a complaint or a petition. Those
states that have enacted both forms, Florida for example, allow for a
prosecutorial waiver with offense limitations for youth up to a specified
age, and a legislative waiver, with offense limitations for youth below that
specified age.
As of June 30, 1986, 23 states and the District of Columbia had
enacted some form of legislative waiver, be it legislative offense exclusion
or prosecutorial waiver. The minimum age of eligibility for waiver is
typically 14 to 16, yet six states have no minimum age requirement. Seven
states allow for concurrent jurisdiction (prosecutorial waiver), and 22 use
offense exclusion to waive jurisdiction. Offenses that are subject to these
waiver methods vary from any offense charged, such as in Nebraska, to
only those youth who are charged with murder, as in Pennsylvania. In
those states that allow concurrent jurisdiction, only two do not have
limitations on the offense charged, the remaining five specify offenses that
are eligible, typically Class 1 Index Crimes. Those states that mandate
offense exclusion typically focus on Class 1 Index Crimes, and six of the 15
states require a prior felony conviction in addition to a present felony
offense charge to qualify for waiver (Feld, 1987).
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The Michigan Juvenile Waiver Package
During the 1988 session of the Michigan legislature, a sixty- eight
bill crime package was introduced that dealt with the handling of
juveniles charged with serious crimes. Critics of the juvenile justice
system felt that the juvenile court was unable to rehabilitate these young,
chronic, and violent youth, nor was it able to punish or incapacitate them.
These critics stated that such youth should automatically be tried and
sentenced as adults. Still other critics argued that the judicial waiver of
jurisdiction was not being used enough, because the waiver criteria were
too difficult to satisfy (Duranczyk, Harp, & Minock, 1988). Under the
traditional judicial waiver, prosecutors had to petition a juvenile court
judge in order to charge the youth as an adult, a procedure that was
criticized by law enforcement officials and legislators, who felt the juvenile
court was being too lenient with juvenile offenders (Nowlin, 1989). They
held that if a juvenile is charged with a specified offense(s), he or she
should be subject to the criminal justice system, unless able to prove
himself or herself amenable to treatment in the juvenile justice system
(Duranczyk, Harp, & Minock, 1988).
The legislature rejected this sixty-eight bill package, instead
creating a new, hybrid waiver system. Referred to as the Juvenile Waiver
Package, it consists of 13 Public Acts which allows the prosecutor more
discretionary power and restricts the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
This prosecutorial waiver method, referred to in Michigan as the
automatic waiver, was implemented and works in conjunction with the
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traditional judicial waiver method. If the prosecuting attorney has reason
to believe that a juvenile, 15 years of age but less than 17 years of age, has
violated one or more of nine specified offenses, the prosecuting attorney
may authorize the filing of a complaint and warrant on the charge with a
magistrate concerning the juvenile in the court having general criminal
jurisdiction. The offenses that are eligible for prosecutorial waiver include
first degree murder; second degree murder; attempted murder; armed
robbery; armed assault with intent to rob or steal; first degree criminal
sexual conduct; manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to
I

manufacture or deliver 650 grams or more of any schedule one or two
controlled substance; and possession of 650 grams or more of any schedule
one or two controlled substance (MCL 712A.2(a)(l)). Each of these
offenses are Class lA felonies and punishable by up to life in prison. This
legislation gives the prosecutor the discretion in deciding which court the
youth in question should be tried in, either criminal or juvenile. If the
judicial forum is the adult court, and the youth has been tried and
convicted, the judge still retains the option of sentencing him in either the
criminal justice system or the juvenile justice system, dependent on which
is found to be in the best interests of both society and the youth. In
making this determination at the juvenile's sentencing hearing, the judge
must consider the same criteria that are considered at the traditional
judicial waiver hearing, which were listed previously (MCL 769.1(3)(a)-(O).
After the Juvenile Waiver Package was passed, it was thought to be
the appropriate response to violent youth crime. Critics of the traditional
judicial waiver system, notably Wayne County personnel, felt the new
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method of waiver to be an appropriate response to serious juvenile crime,
being a way to ensure harsher punishment for chronic and violent juvenile
offenders, thereby allowing for greater protection of the general public
through incarceration. In passing this legislation, Michigan became the
second state, Nebraska being the first, to give jurisdictional power to the
prosecuting attorney without first having his or her decision advocated
judicially (Nowlin, 1988).
The Juvenile Waiver Package was not without problems, and
opponents of the revised waiver statute say that it is not the answer to
reducing the juvenile crime rate in Michigan. An informal survey of
Kalamazoo area attorneys and judges by the Kalamazoo Gazette brings
attention to some of these problems. First, depending on the offense the
youth was convicted of, he or she may spend less time in prison than if
sentenced in the juvenile court for the same offense. This is not what was
expected, as the intent was harsher punishment within the adult system.
Second, the Departm�nt of Corrections offers few services designed to
rehabilitate juveniles placed in prisons. This is no surprise, as the adult
system, unlike the juvenile system, does not have rehabilitation as a goal.
What is of concern is youth being placed in prisons with adult criminals,
then being returned to the community after completing their sentence.
Not only might they do less time in the adult system, but the time that
they do serve is going to be more detriµiental than comparable time served
in the juvenile system. Finally, more than half of the youths convicted
under the discretionary waiver method at the time this survey was
conducted had been committed to the Department of Social Services, the

juvenile justice system, instead of the Department of Corrections, the
adult justice system, as was the intention. This means that most juveniles
waived are being sent to training schools anyway, which is where they
would have been sent in the first place (Nowlin, 1989). Robert Cleland,
president of the Michigan Prosecuting Attorneys Association says that the
"general trend in sentencing by adult judges runs counter to the intent of
the Michigan Legislature when they passed the law. The intent was to
commit juveniles who have taken adult risks and exhibited adult criminal
behavior to adult prisons" (as quoted in Nowlin, 1989: p. 13). Cleland
continues, saying that "if over the long haul, like one or two more years,
we find that 70 to 80 percent of these cases are being referred back to the
juvenile justice system, theri I think we're going to have to take a serious
look at how this law is being utilized by the justice system" (as quoted in
Nowlin, 1989: p. 13). It is the intent of this research to determine how the
Juvenile Waiver Package is being used in practice, and whether the goal
of harsher punishment for violent youth
offenders is being met.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
As previously stated, there has been in recent years an increase in
the number of states that are restricting the juvenile court's jurisdiction.
The rehabilitative ideals of the court are being questioned as to their
effectiveness, and legislatures are turning to the criminal court as a
solution to the problem ofjuveniles not being rehabilitated by the juvenile
court (Braithewaite & Shore, 1981; Champion, 1989). The waiver of
jurisdiction is being used for predominantly two reasons. First is to
identify youth that are considered dangerous and intractable. Second is to
provide greater protection for the general public through harsher
punishment, via incarceration in the adult court, than is possible in the
juvenile court (Bortner, 1986).
Determinants of the Waiver Decision
As the waiver method is being used with greater frequency, it is
important to know the reasoning on which such decisions are based.
Fagan and Deschenes (1990) conducted a study to determine whether
waiver decisions are based on standards derived from statutory criteria or
from extra-legal discretionary factors. The data were collected from four
urban courts (Boston, Detroit, Newark, and Phoenix) from 1981 to 1984 on
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201 youth for whom prosecutors had filed motions for transfer. In order to
be eligible, the youth had to be charged with a violent crime and have one
or more prior felony convictions, the only exception being a current charge
of first degree murder, in which case no prior felony convictions were
necessary. Of those youth in the sample, 38% were waived to criminal
court, the remainder being retained in the juvenile court. Data from police
reports, juvenile court records and court histories, along with statutory
criteria used in each court were then examined to identify any differences
between those youth waived and those retained.
Evident from examining the statutory criteria, the standards used
in a waiver motion varied, providing a mix of both specific and non-specific
criteria. Generally, the criteria that judges considered in making the
decision were discretionary, as was the extent to which the judge must
rely on such criteria. There was a relationship between the psycho-social
development of youth, the age at onset of delinquency, and subsequent
delinquency and aggression. The more mature the youth, the earlier the
age of onset of delinquency, and the longer his or her record since onset
increased the likelihood of waiver. Also affecting the waiver decision was
the number of co-participants and victims. That is, the greater the
number of co-participants and victims, the more likely a waiver. The age
at offense itself was only associated with transfer in Phoenix, a finding
that was mirrored by Bortner (1986). The time from the juvenile's age at
offense to the juvenile court jurisdictional limit was found to be related in
all courts except Newark. To wit, the closer the youth was to the juvenile
court's jurisdictional age limit, the more probable a successful waiver
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motion. The type of offense committed was found to be a determinant, as
was the number of victims and co-participants: the more heinous the
crime and the larger the number of victims the greater the likelihood of
transfer. One important indicator with regard to the statutory criteria
considered was the length of the juvenile's delinquent career and age at
onset of delinquency: a lengthier record and earlier age at onset of
delinquency resulted in a greater likelihood of transfer. In summation,
Fagan and Deschenes (1990) found that the most consistent contributors
for a waiver of jurisdiction were age at offense, age at onset of
delinquency, and having a current charge of murder. Transfer was not
biased by age or motivated by race, with past record and proximity to
juvenile court jurisdictional limit having the strongest relationship to
waiver.
Fagan, Forst, and Vivona (1987) used the same data as Fagan and
Deschenes ( 1990) to examine any racial differences present in the waiver
decision. The goal was to determine if the transfer decision, based on the
dangerousness of the youth and his or her being beyond the rehabilitative
capabilities of the juvenile court, varied by race. Two samples were used,
both consisting of violent youth, the only difference being whether or not
the youth was considered for transfer. The findings did not support the
hypothesis that youth were waived at different rates due to race. Of those
for whom the prosecutor sought a waiver of jurisdiction, there was no
significant difference between minority and white youth, and only a slight
difference in those successfully waived versus those retained. This
difference was found only for the number of victims: minority youth who

were successfully waived had fewer victims in the offense charged than
did white youth. However, this was stated to not be a determining factor
in the waiver decision. The determinants of the transfer decision across all
four sites were the same, being age at onset of delinquency, age at offense,
or a present charge of murder. Age and offense criteria were consistent
determinants of a decision to waive jurisdiction. Judges were primarily
concerned with specific types of offenses, and the closer a youth was to the
maximum age of juvenile court jurisdiction the more likely a motion of
waiver (Fagan, Forst, & Vivona, 1987).
The findings of Fagan and Deschenes (1990) and Fagan, Forst, and
Vivona (19987) are consistent with those of Barnes and Franz (1990), who
found that legal criteria were the determining factors in waiver motions.
This study collected data from two courts, for 206 waiver motions filed
between March, 1978, and December, 1983. The contributions of three
variables were examined: demographic, organizational and legal.
Demographic variables included gender and race; organizational variables
included the use of plea bargaining; and legal variables included the
seriousness of the present offense charged and the juvenile's past record.
The variables that were found to result in a waiver motion were the legal
ones considered, which included the seriousness of the present offense, the
number and nature of prior offenses, and previous attempts at
rehabilitation. The contribution of demographic and organizational
variables was determined to not noticeably contribute to a waiver decision
(Barnes & Franz, 1989).
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Identifying the Dangerous and Intractable
One objective of waiver is to identify those youth that are dangerous
and intractable, in order to remove them from the general public for its
own protection (Bortner, 1986). Bishop, Frazier, and Henretta (1989)
analyzed Florida's waiver law, which consists of the traditional judicial
waiver and a prosecutorial waiver, and found the waiver of jurisdiction
was seldom used for the youth for whom it was intended. After reviewing
a total of 583 cases of waiver in two Florida counties, the authors came to
the following conclusions. If the criterion of dangerousness used is the
commission of a violent felony, only 29% of those waived could be
considered as dangerous. The majority of the youth waived, 55%, were
charged with property felonies, of which half were grand theft, the
remainder being burglaries of automobiles and unoccupied dwellings. The
question that arises is whether or not these same youth were intractable,
which the findings do not support. Of those youth waived, only 35% had
previously been committed to a residential facility, the majority having
been only placed on probation or ordered to community service or to pay
restitution. In 23% of the cases, youth were transferred for a first offense.
Bishop, Frazier, and Henretta (1989) stated in summation that these
youth were not as a whole intractable, nor could those waived be
considered dangerous.
Bortner (1986) also found that the dangerous and intractable were
not identified in her study of youth subject to waiver. Using the same
criterion as Bishop, Frazier, and Henretta (1989) to assess dangerousness,
it was found that the juveniles waived were more likely to be charged with
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property offenses. The study examined 214 youth subject to waiver in a
large metropolitan county during the years 1980 and 1981. Case histories
were examined to provide an analysis of the decision making process,
along with interviews of juvenile court personnel. Only 55% of the
juveniles were charged soley with felonies against persons (violent
felonies), and 61% were charged soley with property felonies. After
e:,ramining the prior records of these same juveniles, Bortner (1986) stated
that there is nothing to suggest that they are distinguishable from other
juvenile offenders, and therefore intractable. For example, 48.3% of the
youth waived to adult court had fewer referrals than did those juveniles
committed to the juvenile division of the department of corrections at the
time. These findings by Bishop, Frazier, and Henretta (1989) and Bortner
(1986) were consistent with those of Champion (1989).
Champion (1989) found not only that the number of waiver
hearings is increasing in recent years, which is closely associated with the
public's rejection of the rehabilitative ideals of the juvenile court, but also
that the wrong population is being targeted and then waived. His research
examined the use of waiver in Tennessee, Virginia, Mississippi, and
Georgia, for the years 1980 through 1988. Also, it identified and charted
the punishments imposed upon conviction in the criminal court. Data
were not available on the length of sentence received, only on the type of
disposition given. The findings showed that there is a trend towards an
increased use of the waiver for less serious property offenses and a
decrease in use of the waiver for violent offenses such as rape, robbery,
and homicide. It needs to be clarified that the number of waiver hearings
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for all offenses increased over the eight year period, it was the percentages
of the offenses waived which accounted for an overall increase in property
offenses and a proportionate decrease in violent offenses. In summation,
Champion (1989) states that if a goal of waiver is to identify those youth
deemed dangerous and intractable, then the wrong population is being
targeted for waiver.
In Minnesota there exists a law which subjects youth to the adult
court if they satisfy age, offense, and prior record requirements, all of
which are intended to presume them unfit for the juvenile court. Osburn
and Rode (1984) found that this law is also identifying the wrong
population. One hundred and forty five court files were examined for
youth waived, both prior to the legislative waiver taking effect and after it
was implemented. They found that only one third of the youth met the
requirement for waiver after the law was implemented, and only 45.5% of
these were actually waived. The conclusion was that the law identifies as
fit for waiver youth who should remain in the juvenile court, and fails to
identify youth who should be transferred (Osburn & Rode, 1984).
Providing for Greater Public Protection
A second rationale for waiver is that, by identifying the dangerous
and intractable youth, it will provide greater protection for the public by
allowing for harsher punishment in the adult court than is possible in the
juvenile court. Bortner (1986) found to the contrary: waiver does not
identify those youth who are dangerous and intractable, nor does it result
in greater public protection. Of the 214 cases analyzed, there was a
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conviction rate in the adult court of 95.2%, with the most common
disposition being probation, which accounted for 63.1% of the sample. Of
these cases in which probation was the primary disposition received, less
than half(47.4%) received jail sentences as a condition of probation. Those
incarcerated, either in prison or jail, accounted for 31.7% of the sample,
with the majority of them receiving prison sentences (30.8%).
Additionally, not only is there an absence of high incarceration rates,
there is also an absence of long periods of incarceration. The typical
sentence received for those who were incarcerated was less than nine
months in jail or five years in prison. As a significant number of juveniles
waived are returned to the community immediately or shortly after
conviction, it is clear that the intended goal of greater public protection is
not being met(Bortner, 1986).
This is similar to findings in Florida by Thomas and Bilchik(1985),
where the average sentence length of youth waived and given a prison
sentence was 47.6 months, or slightly less than four years. This accounted
for 66.5% of those convicted, with the remaining 32.1% of those found
guilty placed on probation. The conviction rate in Florida, for the cases
analyzed that went to trial, was also high, being 90.4%. Thomas and
Bilchik (1985) stated that the ultimate· dispositions handed down in
Florida were neither harsh nor lenient for the offense charged, and did not
make a reference to the perceived public protection provided.
Champion (1989) found somewhat different results than Thomas
and Bilchik (1985) for those waived and convicted. In his study of waiver
use and outcome in four states over a eight year period, 74% of the youths
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in question received probation, with 15% receiving jail or prison sentences,
which is nearly opposite the findings of Thomas and Bilchik (1985). The
remainder received split sentences, such as probation or home
incarceration with jail as a condition of probation. This can be interpreted
as the waiver not providing greater public protection, as a clear majority
of those waived remained in the community (Champion, 1989).
Consistent with Champion (1989) is a study done of the New York
Juvenile Offender Law. In passing this law, which is a legislative
exclusion waiver method, it was hoped that it would remove violent youth
from the juvenile court and, through incarceration of the same, lower
juvenile crime rates. Singer and McDowall (1988) found, however, that the
law did not have any effect on juvenile crime rates, accordingly not
providing any greater protection of the public. To determine the effect of
the law, the authors used an interrupted time series analysis, comparing
crime levels before and after the law was passed.

Monthly juvenile

arrests for homicide, rape, robbery, assault, and arson were analyzed,
with arrest data coming from the Uniform Crime Reports for youth aged
thirteen to fifteen. It was concluded by Singer and McDowall (1988) that
the Juvenile Offender Law did not have an effect on the rates of homicide,
assault, rape or arson. The best case for the law having a deterrent effect
was on the rate of robberies: while it did not decrease the rate of robberies,
it did prevent an anticipated increase in that rate. As the law did not
have any deterrent effect on violent juvenile crime rates, it can be stated
that it did not provide greater public protection (Singer & McDowall,
1988).
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Gillespie and Norman (1984) also found that the waiver of
jurisdiction was not providing any greater protection to the public. Data
was examined from 1967 to 1980, for 132 youth waived to criminal courts
in Utah. The predominant reason for a waiver motion was to protect the
public after all the rehabilitative options in the juvenile court have failed,
yet this goal was not being met. Of those cases analyzed for dispositions,
there was a conviction rate of 76% in the adult system. Forty-seven
percent of these were sentenced to prison, with 20% serving their time in
the county jail. Of those sent to prison, half were released after serving an
average of 2.74 years. This means that only 23% of those waived were
removed from the community for more than 2.74 years, which supports
the authors' conclusion that society is not well protected by use of the
waiver in the state of Utah.
Concluding Remarks
As is evident from the preceding studies, the waiver of jurisdiction
is not identifying those youth deemed dangerous, violent, and intractable,
nor is it providing any greater protection to the general public through
harsher punishment. There are several explanations for the wrong
population, namely property offenders, being waived. First, many of the
juveniles subject to waiver motions are recidivists or chronic delinquents
who have histories of minor offenses. Therefore the waiver is used more as
a way of dealing with recidivists than with violent juveniles (Champion,
1989). Second, Bishop, Frazier, and Henretta (1989) found that juveniles
who had not committed serious, violent felonies, nor had lengthy offense
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histories, were waived because they were nearing the maximum age of
juvenile court jurisdiction. It should be stated that in Michigan the
prosecutorial waiver does not allow for a waiver of jurisdiction for youth
charged with property offenses: six of the eight offenses which are eligible
for waiver are violent felonies, the remaining two being felony drug
offenses. For this reason, the fear of waiver not targeting the intended
population is minimized, as it is only possible to waive violent offenders in
the state of Michigan. It is possible, however, that the law can be abused
with regard to identifying the intractable. Whether those youth waived in
Michigan are in fact intractable, based on their offense histories and
previous attempts at rehabilitation, is not of primary importance for this
research. Of primary interest is the notion of harsher punishment, which
is intended to provide greater protection for the public, and whether the
Michigan Juvenile Waiver Package is meeting its intended goal of harsher
punishment for youth waived under the discretionary waiver method.

CHAPTERIII
METHODOLOGY
Introduction
The present research will examine the use of the Michigan Juvenile
Waiver Package, also referred to as the automatic waiver, in Wayne
County, Michigan over a five year period beginning October 1, 1988 when
the law took effect and ending October 1, 1993. The following sections will
discuss the research objectives and the sample, and provide a definition of
the variables. Tms will be followed by a brief discussion on the data
collection method. Finally, descriptive statistics of the data that was
collected will be presented.
Objectives
The goals of this research are to determine the following: the
conviction rate for youth tried in criminal court following an automatic
waiver; the outcome of the case following waiver and conviction; and how
the outcome varies with respect to age, race, sex, and the offense charged.
Sample
Data were collected at the Recorder's Court in Wayne County,
Michigan. Wayne County was used as the site for this research for two
reasons. First, as mentioned in Chapter I, it was in Wayne County that
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the waiver law was seen as an appropriate response to serious juvenile
crime. Second, according to a study done by the Office of Children and
Youth Services, Wayne County alone accounts for approximately half of
all waivers in the state of Michigan in any given year, and will be the only
county in Michigan from which a large sample can be drawn (Gutske,
1990). Youth were considered eligible for inclusion in this study if they
met two requirements: they were waived to adult court via the
discretionary waiver method and subsequently tried; and the date of the
motion for waiver was between October 1, 1988, and October 1, 1993.
Variables

The year of waiver was one of the following: 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991,
1992, or 1993. This time frame was used in order that changes in the use
of waiver over time can be analyzed. As the law took effect on October 1,
1988, there is only a three month period of that year that can be
examined. The four years that follow are complete years. Data were
collected in 1993 through October 1 which allowed for a full five year time
period. It should be noted that data collection stopped on October 1, 1993
not only because of the five year time period, but also because at the time
data were being collected, few, if any, of those youth waived in the last
four months of 1993, had been tried or even gone to trial.
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The age of the offender was recorded, and was either 15 or 16 years
of age. Youths under age 15 are ineligible for waiver regardless of the
offense charged, and youths aged 17 or older are no longer under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court. This information will allow the
researcher to determine if the age of the offender has any effect on the
offense charged or the outcome.

The race of the offender was collected and coded as either white,
black, or other. Youths listed as "other" include Native American,
Hispanic, Asian, and all others that are not classified as either white or
black. The researcher will then use this information to determine if the
offense charged or the outcome varies with respect to the race of the
offender.

The sex of the offender was recorded, �d listed as either male or
female. The researcher will use this information to determine if the
offense charged or the outcome varies with respect to the sex of the
offender.
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Offense Charged
The offense charged was one of seven felonies that are eligible for
waiver of jurisdiction. These include: murder; assault with intent to
commit murder; robbery, armed; assault with intent to rob, armed;
criminal sexual conduct; possession of 650 grams or more of a Type I
Controlled Substance; and possession with intent to deliver of 650 grams
or more of a Type I Controlled Substance. These are all Class 1A felonies,
punishable by up to life in prison. The offense charged was collected to
determine the number of waivers for each offense, and how age, race, sex,
and outcome varied with respect to this variable.
Outcome
The outcome was recorded to allow the researcher to determine its
variation with respect to age, race, sex, and offense charged. The outcome
can range from dismissal to commitment to the Department of Social
Services (DSS) until the youth reaches the age of 21, or commitment to the
Department of Corrections (DOC). For youths sentenced to DOC, the
sentence received was noted as either probation or the minimum number
of years that must be served (minimum sentence).
One of the objectives of the research is to determine how the
outcome varies with respect to age, race, sex, and offense charged.
Additionally, the researcher wanted to determine, for youth sentenced to
DOC, if the sentence received upon conviction was similar to, with respect
to .the minimum sentence, that received by youth sentenced to DSS. To do
this, and make this comparison, the minimum sentence received in DOC

was listed as less than five years, six to ten years, and so on in five year
increments. The logic behind this is that any youth with a minimum
sentence of five years or less in DOC would be confined no longer than if
he or she had been sentenced to DSS. To wit, if a youth aged fifteen or
sixteen is sentenced as a juvenile, either in the criminal or juvenile court,
the longest period that he or she can be held is to age 21, or five years (an
absolute maximum of six years if arrested, convicted, and sentenced on
the day of his or her fifteenth birthday). While there will be a difference in
the maximum amount of time that could be served in DSS, with age at
offense being the detennining factor, it is the researcher's belief that this
difference is minimal, and for the sake of simplicity is stated as five years.
Data Collection Method
To obtain the sample, two steps were taken. First, a list of youths
waived to the adult court was obtained from the Wayne County
Prosecuting Attorney's Office. This list consisted of all youths who were
waived to the adult court, either by the traditional judicial waiver or by
the discretionary waiver. From this list, those youths waived via the
discretionary waiver method were extracted. A separate list was also
supplied from the Recorder's Court, by way of the mainframe computer,
and included all youths waived via the discretionary waiver method.
These lists were then compared and cross referenced to ensure that a
complete listing of all eligible youths was provided. It should be noted that
there were instances in which a youth's name appeared on the
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prosecutor's list and did not appear on the Recorder's Court list. These
youth were omitted, as there was no record of any trial having occurred.
The final list of all youths waived via the discretionary waiver
method consisted of 361 cases. The individual's name was entered onto the
Recorder's Court computer to arrive at a case number for the youth in
question. After obtaining the case number for each youth, the legal file for
each was obtained to collect the necessary information. In those instances
where there was more than one person by the name in question, the
appropriate case number was obtained by cross referencing the case
number with the date of birth and the offense charged. The necessary
information from the legal file was then entered on the data collection
instrument (See 'Figure 1).
Descriptive Statistics of Data Collected
Data were collected on 361 youths waived to the Recorder's Court
between October 1, 1988, and October 1, 1993. Table 1 shows the
distribution of waivers over the five year period. The use of the
discretionary waiver was at its highest immediately following the law's
implementation in 1989. The use of waiver then decreased dramatically
and leveled off for the remainder of the five year period.
The age of the offender was either 15 or 16 years of age. Youths
aged 15 accounted for 29.6% (n =107) of all youth waived, with youths
aged 16 accounting for the remaining 70.4% (n =254) of the sample (See
Table 2).
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Case File Number______ Name______

Date of Birth ______ Date ofWaiver______

Race__White
__Black
__Other

Sex __Male
__Female

Offense Charged: __Murder
__Assault with Intent to Commit Murder
__Robbery,Armed
__Assault with Intent to Rob, Armed
__Criminal Sexual Conduct
__Possession of 650 Grams or more of a Type I
Controlled Substance
__Possesion of 650 Grams or More of a Type I
Controlled Substance with Intent to Deliver

Outcome __Dismissed
__Not Guilty
__Guilty, Department of Social Services toAge 21
__Guilty, Department of Corrections
Sentence Received:

------

Figure 1. Data Collection Instrument.
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Table 1
Distribution of Waiver by Year
Year

Frequency

Percent

1988

11

3.0

1989

113

31.2

1990

58

16.0

1991

73

20.2

1992

54

14.9

1993

52

14.2

Total

361

100.0

Table 2
Distribution of Waiver by Age
Age

Frequency

Percent

15

107

29.6

16

254

70.4

Total

361

100.0
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The race of the offender was either white, black, or other. Those
youths listed as white comprised 14.4% (n =52) of the sample, with blacks
consisting of 83.1% (n =300) of the sample, and youths listed as other
consisting of the remaining 2.5% (n =9) of the sample (See Table 3). The
distribution of youth waived by race is similar to the overall juvenile court
racial distribution, with blacks occurring in greater frequency as the
severity of the offense charged increases. In the Wayne County Juvenile
Court Records, 65.2% of the juveniles were black, and 66.7% of youths who
had a formal hearing were black. Examining all felony offenses, 74.8% of
the youths were black. Narrowing the scope, 82.6% of the youths charged
with personal felonies were black. Youth listed as white or other consisted
of the remaining 17.4% (Bynum, Wordes, & Corley, 1993). This is nearly
identical to the racial distribution of youths waived, in which 83.1% were
black and 16.9% were white or other.
Table 3
Distribution of Waiver by Race
Race

Frequency

Percent

White

52

14.4

Black

300

83.1

Other

9

2.5

Total

361

100.0

The sex of the youth waived was either male or female, with a
disproportionate number of offenders being male. Of 361 youths waived,
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only 0.6% (n =2) were female. The remaining 359 youths were male (See
Table 4). The distribution of waiver by sex is dramatically different than
the distribution of personal felonies by sex in the juvenile court, where
females accounted for 16.1 % of those charged with personal felonies
(Bynum, Wordes, & Corley, 1993). In making these comparisons, it needs
to be stated that the two categories being compared, youth waived to the
Recorder's Court and youth charged with personal felonies in the juvenile
court, are not identical. It is not known how many of the females charged
in juvenile court with personal felonies were in fact eligible for waiver,
although it was expected to be somewhat higher. Due to limitations in the
� data used to make these comparisons, a more specific comparison on the
distribution of waiver by sexis not possible.
Table 4
Distribution of Waiver by Sex
Sex

Frequency

Percent

Male

359

99.4

Female

2

0.6

Total

361

100.0

The offense charged was one of six: murder; assault with intent to
commit murder; robbery, armed; assault with intent to rob, armed;
criminal sexual conduct, or possession of 650 grams or more of a Type I
Controlled Substance. It should be noted that the law stipulates there are
seven waivable offenses, with possession of 650 grams or more of a Type I
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Controlled Substance accounting for two of the seven, the difference being
possession or possession with intent to deliver. However, the Recorder's
Court did not make a distinction between these two offenses, leaving only
six different charges (See Table 5). The most common charge for which
· waiver occurred was murder, accounting for 45.0% of all cases of waiver.
The second most prevalent charge was one of assault with intent to
commit murder (21. 7%), followed closely by robbery, armed (20.5%).
Criminal sexual conduct charges accounted for 9.1% of the sample, and
assault with intent to rob, armed accounted for 3.1%. Finally, possession
of 650 grams or more of a type I controlled substance had two occurrences,
accounting for 0.6% of all waivers.
The possible outcomes consisted of one of the following: not guilty;
dismissed; guilty, sentenced to DSS (until age 21); guilty, sentenced to
DOC with probation; guilty, sentenced to DOC for confinement of five
years or less; guilty, sentenced to DOC for confinement of six to ten years;
guilty, sentenced to DOC for confinement of eleven to fifteen years; guilty,
sentenced to DOC for confinement of sixteen to twenty years; and guilty,
sentenced to DOC for life. The most common outcome was DSS,
accounting for 43.3% (n =145) of the sample. Those youth sentenced to
DOC accounted for 34.3% (n =115) of the sample. The remaining youth
were found not guilty or had their case dismissed (See Table 6).
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Table 5
Distribution of Waiver by Offense Charged
Offense

Frequency

Percent

Murder

158

45.0

Assault with Intent
to Commit Murder

76

21.7

Robbery,Armed

72

20.5

Assault with Intent to
Rob,Armed

11

3.1

Criminal Sexual
Conduct

32

9.1

2

0.6

351*

100.0

Possession of 650
Grams or More of A
Type I Controlled
Substance
Total

* The total number of waivers does not equal 361 cases due to incomplete case file
information on the Recorder's Court computer.

As stated previously, the goals of this research are to determine the
following: the conviction rate for youth tried in the criminal court
following a discretionary waiver; the outcome following waiver and
conviction; and how the outcome varies with respect to age, race, sex, and
offense charged. With the above described data on the age, race, sex,
offense charged, and outcome for all youth waived to adult court over a
five year period in Wayne County, MI, an analysis will be done to realize
these goals.
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Table 6
Distribution of Waiver by Outcome
Outcome

Frequency

Percent

Dismissed

42

12.5

Not Guilty

33

9.9

DSS

145

43.3

DOC Probation

2

0.6

DOC 1-5

26

7.8

DOC 6-10

37

11.0

DOC 11-15

11

3.3

DOC 16-20

18

5.4

DOC Life

21

6.3

Total

335*

100.0

* The

total number of waivers does not equal 361 cases due to incomplete case file
information on the Recorder's Court Computer.

CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Introduction
The following discussion will present the results of the data
analysis, as well as some initial substantive findings. First to be presented
will be the distribution of waiver by year, followed by the distribution of
waiver by age, race, and sex. This was done to determine changes in the
use of waiver over time, and also to ascertain whether waiver varied with
respect to age, race, and sex. Following this, the offense charged will be
examined, to allow a determination of how individual offenses varied in
frequency of waiver over the five year period being examined. Next to be
presented will be the distribution of the different outcomes, to realize any
changes in the occurrence of such outcomes over time. Finally, the results
of several cross tabulations that were performed, to determine any
relationship that existed between age, race, charge, and outcome, will be
presented.
Distribution of Waiver
Distribution of Waiver by Year
The total number of juveniles waived from October 1, 1988, when
the discretionary waiver law took effect, through October 1, 1993, the end
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of the five year period being examined, was 361. The number of waivers
fluctuated each year, from a high of 113 cases in 1989, the first full year
the law was in effect, to a low of 54 cases in 1992, the last full year the law
has been in effect. The rate of waiver for the years 1988 and 1993 was
such that had a full year elapsed, the number of waivers would have been
neither the highest nor the lowest for any of the five years .examined. The
highest number of waivers occurred just after the law took effect, in 1989.
The use of waiver then decreased dramatically and leveled off over the
next 4 years (See Table 1).
Distribution of Waiver by Offense Char�d and by Afle, Race, and Sex
Youth aged 15 at time of waiver accounted for 107 cases, comprising
29.6% of youth waived. The remaining 70.4%, consisting of 253 youth,
were aged 16 (See Table 2). The distribution of age for each offense was
similar, with murder, assault with intent to commit murder, robbery,
armed, and criminal sexual conduct all within a three percentile range of
the average (See Table 7). There were two exceptions: assault with intent
to commit robbery, armed, showed an older age distribution, with 81.8% of
youths aged 16; and possession of 650 grams or more of a type I controlled
substance had two occurrences, with both youth aged 16. That the
majority of youths waived were age 16 was expected, it being consistent
with the findings of previous research. Youths aged 16 at the time of
offense are within one year of the juvenile court's jurisdictional age limit
in Michigan, and as stated in Chapter II, the closer a youth is to the
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jurisdictional age limit of the juvenile court, the more likely it is that he or
she will be waived (Bortner, 1986; Champion, 1989).
Table 7
Distribution of Percent Waived by Offense Charged and Age
Age 15

Age 16
(n)

%

Offense Charged

% (n)

Murder

31.0 (49)

69.0 (109)

Assault with Intent to
Commit Murder

26.3 (20)

73.7 (56)

Robbery,Armed

31.9 (23)

68.1 (49)

Assault with Intent to
Rob,Armed

18.2 (2)

81.8 (9)

Criminal Sexual
Conduct

31.3 (10)

68.8 (22)

Possession of 650
Grams

0.0 (0)

100.0 (2)

Total

100 (104)

100 (247)

With respect to race, 82.9% of the youth waived (n =300) were
black, and 14.4% (n =52) were white. The remainder of the sample, nine
youth equating to 2.5% of all youth waived, were classified as other, which
includes Native American, Hispanic, Asian, etc. (See Table 3). As only
nine youth were classified as other, these youths were then combined with
those originally classified as white into a non-black category. This was
done for several reasons. First, there was not a large enough sample of
youths classified as other from which to draw any conclusions after the
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offense charged and outcome were taken into account. Second, with only
16.9% of the youths being non-black, and a clear majority (82.9%) being
black, the comparison between the two is apparent. The analysis will
accordingly classify youths waived as being either black or non-black, with
the non-black category containing those youths previously listed as white
or other.
Overall, non-blacks comprised 16.9% of the sample, and blacks the
remaining 82.9%. Three of the seven offenses, murder, assault with intent
to commit murder, and robbery, armed, were within a three percentile
range of the average racial distribution (See Table 8). Assault with intent
to rob, armed consisted of 90.9% black and 9.9% non-black, which was
close to the average distribution by race. Criminal Sexual Conduct is the
one offense that has a considerably larger number of non-black youths
waived, 34.4% of the total, with black youths accounting for only 65.6% of
those charged with criminal sexual conduct. This is noticeably different
than the overall distribution by race, and will be discussed in greater
detail later in Chapter IV.
Virtually all of the waivers over the five year period were of males,
with only 2 instances of female waivers occurring (See Table 4). The first
was for armed robbery, the second for assault with intent to rob, armed.
As only two waivers over the five year period were for females, consisting
of less than 1% of the total, the discussion and analysis that follows will
not be discussed by sex, as there are not enough females in the sample to
warrant such a discussion.
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Table 8
Distribution of Percent Waived by Offense Charged and Race
Offense Charged

Non-Black
% (n)

Black
% (n)

Murder

15.8 (25)

84.2 (133)

Assault with Intent to
Commit Murder

13.2 (10)

86.8 (66)

Robbery,Armed

16.7 (12)

83.3 (60)

Assault with Intent to
Rob,Armed

9.9 (1)

90.9 (10)

Criminal Sexual
Conduct

34.4 (11)

65.6 (21)

Possession of 650
Grams

50.0 (1)

50.0 (1)

Total

100 (60)

100 (291)

Distribution of Percent Waived by Offense Charged, Across Years
The most common offenses for which waiver occurred were murder
(n =158), assault with intent to commit murder (n =76), and robbery,

armed (n =72). Murder charges accounted for 45.0% of all waivers, assault
with intent to commit murder charges accounted for 21.7% of all waivers,
.and robbery, armed charges accounted for 20.5% of all waivers. The
remaining waivers were for, in decreasing order, criminal sexual conduct,
assault with intent to rob, armed, and possession of 650 grams or more of
a Type I Controlled Substance. Criminal sexual conduct waivers occurred
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32 times over the five year period, accounting for 9.1% of waivers, followed
by assault with intent to rob, armed consisting of 11 cases equal to 3.1%,
and possession of 650 grams or more of a type I controlled substance, with
two instances equating to 0.6% of all waivers (See Table 5). The
distribution of offenses is as expected, in that the most serious charges
account for the highest number of waivers. Murder, assault with intent to
commit murder, and robbery, armed, are arguably the most serious and
violent offenses that occur, and accordingly accounted for the greatest
number of waivers. These three offenses combined accounted for 87.2% of
all waivers (See Table 5).
To determine how charges varied in their frequency of occurrence
over time, individual offenses were examined by year for each of the five
years for which data was collected. Murder charges fluctuated from a low
of 27.3% of all waivers in 1988 to a high of 57.0% of all waivers in 1989. In
the remaining four years murder accounted for approximately 40% of all
waivers (See Table 9). As can be seen in Figure 2, charges of murder
increased dramatically after the waiver law took effect, then decreased
and remained steady for the remaining four years. Assault with intent to
murder charges had its lowest rate of occurrence in 1992, and its highest
rate in 1988 (4 of the 11 waivers that year). Assault with intent to commit
murder charges decreased gradually over time, only to increase in
frequency in the last year. A charge of robbery, armed fluctuated from
10.8% to 30.8% of waivers in a given year. Robbery, armed charges have
gradually increased over time, and in 1993 were the second most common
waiver charge. For the charge assault with intent to rob, armed, there
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Table 9
Distribution of Percent Waived by Offense Charged, Across Years
Offense
Charged

1988
% (n)

1989
% (n)

1990 ,
% (n) '

1991
% (n)

1992
% (n)

1993
% (n)

Murder

27.3 (3)

57.0(63)

37.9(22)

40.?(27)

42.3(22)

40.4(21)

Assault
Intent to
Murder

36.4 (4)

23.4(26)

27.6(16)

21.0(14)

9.6(5)

21.2(11)

Robbery,
Armed

18.2 (2)

10.8(13)

19.0(11)

22.4(15)

30.8(16)

28.5(15)

Assault
Intent to
Rob,
Armed

0.0 (0)

0.9 (1)

3.4 (2)

7.5 (5)

1.9 (1)

3.8 (2)

Criminal
Sexual
Conduct

9.1 (1)

6.3 (7)

12.1 (7)

9.0 (6)

15.4 (8)

5.8 (3)

Poss. of
650
Grams

9.1 (1)

0.1 (1)

0.0 (0)

0.0 (0)

0.0 (0)

0.0 (0)

100 (67)

100 (52)

100 (52)

Total

100 (11) 100(111) 100 (58)

were only a handful of cases each year, with nearly half of the total
occurring in 1991. Criminal sexual conduct charges occurred once in 1988,
three times in 1993, and averaged seven per year for the years in between.
Both assault with intent to rob, armed, and criminal sexual conduct cases
have fluctuated in frequency, increasing and/or decreasing yearly (See
Figure 2).
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For the charge possession of 650 grams or more of a type I
controlled substance, there were only two waivers, one in 1988, and the
second in 1989 (See Table 9). There are several possible reasons as to why
there were only two youths waived on this charge. First, possession of 650
grams or more of a type I controlled substance is not a violent, personal
crime, unlike any of the other waivable offenses. Second, this particular
law is intended for those individuals who are selling or in possession of
large quantities, over 650 grams, of illegal drugs. Those individuals who
possess or sell only small amounts (arguably the majority of juveniles who
possess or sell illegal drugs) are therefore not eligible for waiver on drug
charges. Since possession of 650 grams or more of a type I controlled
substance accounts for less than 1% of all waivers, it will be excluded from
further analysis. The discussion that follows will center on the remaining
five offenses.

Distribution of Waiver by Outcome
The overall conviction rate for youth waived and tried in the adult
court for any offense was 77.6% over the five year period. In examining
the different outcomes, regardless of the offense charged, 12.5% resulted
in a dismissal, 9.9% were found not guilty, 43.3% were sentenced to DSS,
0.6% received DOC probation, and 7.8% received sentences of DOC 1-5
years (See Table 6). As mentioned previously, one of the goals was to
determine the percentage of youths who, upon waiver, would be subject to
confinement for periods no longer than if they had not been waived. This
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Figure 2. Distribution of Percent Waived by Offense Charged, Across
Years.

1993
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includes youths who had their case dismissed, were found not guilty, or
were found guilty and sentenced either to DSS, DOC probation, or DOC 15. These five sentences combined accounted for 68% of the outcomes after
waiver. For the remaining youths, 11.0% were given sentences of DOC 610, 3.3% received sentences of DOC 11-15, 5.4% received sentences of DOC
16-20 years, and 6.3% were given sentences of DOC Life. Youth waived
and given minimum sentences in excess of five years accounted for only
26% of all cases of waiver. Sentencing information was not available for
6.0% of waivers (n =26). Of these, nine involved waivers that occurred in
1993 and youths who had yet to be sentenced at the time data was being
collected. For the remaining 17 cases, sentencing information was not
available.
An examination of the original outcomes by year shows a relatively
sparse distribution, with 22% of the cells either empty or having less than
two cases in them (See Table 10). For this reason, the possible outcomes
were recoded and collapsed. First, those youths who had their cases either
dismissed or were found not guilty were combined into a not
guilty/dismissed category, as both outcomes equated to youths no longer
being under the court's jurisdiction. Second, the two cases of DOC
Probation were combined with the DOC 1-5 category. DOC Probation
accounted for less than 1% of all outcomes, and was similar to DOC 1-5 in
several respects: it was the most lenient sentence possible after being
sentenced to DOC, and if a violation of probation occurred, confinement in
the Wayne County Jail for a short period of time (less than 5 years) would
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Table 10
Distribution of Percent Waived by Outcome, Across Years

7

Outcome

1988
% (n)

1989
% (n)

1990
% (n)

1991
% . (n)

1992
% (n)

1993
% (n)

Dismissed

36.3 (4)

9.3 (10)

6.1 (9)

9.7 (6)

9.4 (5)

18.2 (8)

Not Guilty

0.0 (0)

9.3 (10)

7.1 (4)

9.7 (6)

15.1 (8)

11.4 (5)

DSS

9.1 (1)

DOC:

0.0 (0)

1.9 (2)

0.0 (0)

0.0 (0)

0.0 (0)

0.0 (0)

DOC:

9.1 (1)

8.4 (9)

10.7 (6)

8.1 (5)

3.8 (2)

6.8 (3)

DOC:

27.3 (3)

20.2 (22 )

0.0 (0)

8.1 (5)

7.5 (4)

6.8 (3)

DOC:

0.0 (0)

3.7 (4)

0.0 (0)

6.5 (4)

3.8 (2)

2.3 (1)

DOC:

9.1 (1)

6.5 (7)

0.0 (0)

6.5 (4)

5.7 (3)

6.8 (3)

DOC:
Life

9.1 (1)

8.4 (9)

1.8 (1)

8.1 (5)

5.7 (3)

4.5 (2)

100 (62)

100 (53)

100 (44)

Probation

1-5

6-10

11-15

16-20

Total

33.6 (36) 64.3 (36) 43.5 (27) 49.1 (26) 43.2 (19)

100 (11) 100 (109) 100 (56)
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be the result. DOC 1-5 is similar in terms of the length of confinement to
being sentenced to DSS, yet remains different in terms of the conditions of
confinement. Therefore it was combined with DOC probation, and kept as
a separate outcome. DOC 6-10, DOC 11-15, DOC 16-20, and DOC Life
were all combined into one category, DOC 6-Life, as all result in longer
periods of confinement than is possible if given an outcome of DSS.
Table 11 shows the distribution of possible outcomes after they
were recoded and collapsed. Dismissed/Not Guilty outcomes fluctuated by
year, ranging from 18.3% to 36.4% of the total. DSS outcomes had a large
range of variation by year, ranging from 9.1% to 64.3%. The use of DOC 15 remained rather low overall, ranging from a low of 3.9% to a high of
10.7% of all outcomes. It's frequency of occurrence was rather consistent
until 1992, when it decreased dramatically in usage. Similar to DSS, DOC
6-Life had a wide range, accounting for a low of 1.8% of all waivers to a
high of 45.5%. As the Michigan Juvenile Waiver Package was a way by
which prosecutors could try juveniles in the adult court, and logically have
them sentenced to DOC, it comes as a surprise that overall 43.3% of all
youths convicted are returned to DSS upon conviction. And, as 22.4% of
these youths either had their cases dismissed or were found not guilty,
only the remaining 26% were sentenced to DOC for a period of
confinement longer than what is possible in DSS (see Table 11).
Figure 3 shows the different use for each outcome by year.
Dismissed/Not Guilty outcomes decreased after the first year, and then
remained somewhat consistent, although there was some variation. DSS
also fluctuated: its use dramatically increased until 1990, then did the
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Table 11
Distribution of Percent Waived by Outcome, Across Years, Collapsed

Sentence
Dismissed/
Not Guilty

1988
% (n)

1989
% (n)

1990
% (n)

1991
% (n)

1992
% (n)

1993
% (n)

36.4 (4) 18.3 (20) 23.2 (13) 19.4 (12) 24.5 (13) 29.5 (13)

DSS

9.1 (1)

33.6 (36) 64.3 (36) 43.5 (27) 49.1 (26) 43.2 (19)

DOC
1-5

9.1 (1)

10.1 (1)

10.7 (6)

DOC
6-Life

45.5 (5) 38.0 (42)

1.8 (1)

Total

100 (11) 100 (109) 100 (56)

8.1 (5)

3.9 (2)

6.8 (3)

29.0 (18) 23.5 (12)

20.5 (9)

100 (62)

100 (44)

100 (53)

opposite, gradually decreasing for the remaining time period. The largest
variation was from 1989 to 1990, when the percentage of youths sentenced
to DSS nearly doubled. The outcome of DOC 1-5 was the most stable of the
four, there being no changes in its use by year as dramatic as the other
possible outcomes. This is not surprising, as a majority of the youths
sentenced to DOC were for charges of murder, arguably the most serious
of the waivable offenses, and the offense that accounted for most of the
DOC 6-Life outcomes. In the years immediately following the law's
implementation, DOC 6-Life showed a large amount of variance, reaching
a low in 1990, with only 1 person receiving said outcome. In the final three
years of analysis its use became more consistent (See Figure 3).
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Cross Tabulations
To determine if any relationship existed between age, race, charge
and outcome, cross tabulations were done on the following: age by charge,
race by charge, age by outcome, race by outcome, and charge by outcome.
The following section discusses the findings of:these cross tabulations.

Age by Charge
The offense charged did not vary by the age of the offender, with
individual charges remaining within a three percentile range of the
overall average for both ages . The distribution of the five offenses was
similar for youths aged either 15 and 16, with there being no significant
relationship (x2 = 1.45231; p =.84) (see Table 12).

Race by Charge
Blacks had a slightly higher representation across the charges of
murder, assault with intent to commit murder, and assault with intent to
rob, armed. For the charge of robbery, armed, both blacks and non-blacks
had a nearly identical representation. Criminal sexual conduct charges
were the exception: 7 .2% of blacks were charged with criminal sexual
conduct, and 18.6% of non-blacks had such a charge. Non-blacks were
more than twice as likely to have a charge ofcriminal sexual conduct than
were their black counterparts. Whereas in other offenses charged there
was no appreciable difference, criminal sexual conduct charges show a
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Table 12
Cross Tabulation of Age by Charge
Offense Charged

Age 15
% (n)

Age 16
% (n)

Murder

47.1 (49)

44.5 (109)

Assault with Intent to
Commit Murder

19.2 (20)

22.9 (56)

Robbery,Armed

22.1 (23)

20.0 (49)

Assault with Intent to
Rob,Armed

1.9 (2)

3.7 (9)

Criminal Sexual
Conduct

9.6 (10)

9.0 (22)

n=349
x2 =1.45231
p =.83505
gamma= .02198
noticeable change in the distribution of offenses by race (x2= 8.832484; p
=<.10). While this relationship is significant, it is also weak

(gamma =

-.140441), indicating that there are other elements of the crime(s) involved
aside from race alone. The only details known about this charge is that it
was in the first degree: in the absence of greater detail (i.e., were they acts
of rape or molestation, the age of the victim, whether or not weapons were
involved, etc.), it is impossible to ascribe any meaning to non-blacks
having a higher representation (See Table 13).
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Table 13
Cross Tabulation of Race by Charge
Offense Charged

Non-Black
% (n)

Black
% (n)

Murder

42.4 (25)

45.9 (133)

Assault with Intent to
Commit Murder

16.9 (10)

22.8 (66)

Robbery,Armed

20.3 (12)

20.7 (60)

Assauit with Intent to
Rob,Armed

1.7 (1)

3.4 (10)

Criminal Sexual
Conduct

18.6 (11)

7.2 (21)

n=349

x2 = 8.832484
p = .08638
gamma= -.140441

Ar:e by Outcome
There was a relationship with respect to the age of offender and the
outcome of the case (x2 = 16.63421; p =<.01). Youths aged 15 were more
likely to receive outcomes of Dismissed/Not Guilty than youths aged 16
(27.5% vs. 20.2), and also to receive outcomes of DSS (53.9% vs. 38.6%).
Youths aged 16 were more likely to receive outcomes of DOC 1-5 than
youth aged 15 (10.7% vs. 2.9%) and received DOC Life outcomes twice as
much (30.5% vs. 15.7%). These findings are what one would expect: the
older the offender, the more likely (s)he is to be sentenced more severely.
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This is consistent with earlier findings: just as youths nearing the
jurisdictional age limit are more likely to be subject to waiver, so too are
they more likely to be sentenced more severely. Younger offenders were
treated more leniently, as over half of them remained in the juvenile
justice system after conviction in the adult court (See Table 14). However,
while the relationship is significant, it is only of moderate strength
(gamma = .31389), which indicates that age alone is not the primary
determinant of outcome.
Table 14
Cross Tabulation of Age by Outcome
Sentence

Age 15
% (n)

Age 16
% (n)

Dismissed/Not Guilty

27.5 (28)

20.2 (47)

DSS

53.9 (55)

38.6 (90)

DOC 1-5

2.9 (3)

10.7 (25)

DOC Life

15.7 (16)

30.5 (71)

n = 335
x2 = 16.63421
p = .00084
gamma = .31389

Race by Outcome
In looking at the relationship between race and outcome, there was
no significant overall relationship, but there were some interesting
findings nonetheless (x2 = 2.58797; p =.46). Non-blacks and blacks
received outcomes of Dismissed/Not Guilty_ with relatively the same
frequency (20.7% and 22.7%, respectively), with black's representation
only slightly higher. For outcomes of DOC 6-Life, again the frequencies
were relatively the same for non-blacks and blacks (27.6% and 25.6%,
respectively), although here non-blacks had a slightly higher
representation. The interesting findings are in the outcomes ofDSS and
DOC 1-5: non-blacks were more likely to be sentenced to DSS than blacks
(48.3% vs. 42.2%), and less likely to be sentenced to DOC 1-5 (3.4% vs.
9.4%). In other words, blacks were three times more likely to be sentenced
to DOC 1-5 than non-blacks, and less likely to receive an outcome of DSS
(See Table 15).

Charge by Outcome
As expected, there was a relationship between the offense charged
and outcome, in that the more serious the offense charged, the more
severe the outcome of the waiver (x2 = 51.59268;p =<.01). Murder charges
were the most likely to receive outcomes ofDOC 6-Life, with 39.2% of such
charges receiving this outcome. DOC 6-Life was more than twice as
common for a charge of murder than for any other charge, and three times
as likely in most cases. Murder charges were also the least likely to have
outcomes ofDSS andDOC 1-5. The remaining four offenses were quite
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Table 15
Cross Tabulation of Race by Outcome
Sentence

Non-Black
% (n)

Black
% (n)

Dismissed/ Not Guilty

20.7 (12)

22.7 (63)

DSS

48.3 (28)

42.2 (117)

DOC 1-5

3.4 (2)

9.4 (26)

DOC 6-Life

27.6 (16)

25.6 (71)

n = 335
x2 = 2.58797
p = .45960
gamma = .00055
different: all four had approximately half of the

youth convicted

committed to DSS, with the remainder of youth distributed over the
remaining three outcomes. For the charges of robbery, armed, assault
with intent to rob, armed, and criminal sexual conduct, there were only
between 10.8% and 12.9% of these youths given sentences of DOC 6-Life.
A clear majority of youth with these charges did not receive sentences any
more severe after being waived than they would have if waiver had not
occurred. Assault with intent to murder charges resulted in 17 .8% of
youth receiving sentences of DOC 6-Life, and while they were twice as
likely to receive such an outcome than all other charges except murder, it
was used relatively infrequently given the severity of the offense charged
(See Table 16). It needs to be noted that while this relationship is
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significant, it is also weak (gamma = -.17430), which indicates that charge
alone does not account for outcome.
Table 16
Cross Tabulation of Offense Charged by Outcome

DSS
% (n)

DOC
1-5
% (n)

DOC
6-Life
% (n)

22.9 (35)

35.3 (54)

2.6 (4)

39.2 (60)

24.7 (18)

46.6 (34)

11.1 (8)

17.8 (13)

15.4 (10)

55.4 (36)

18.5 (12)

10.8 (7)

Assault with
Intent to
Rob,Armed

11.1 (1)

44.4 (4)

33.3 (3)

11.1 (1)

Criminal
Sexual
Conduct

32.3 (10)

51.6 (16)

3.2 (1)

12.9 (4)

Offense
Charged

Dismissed/
Not Guilty
% (n)

Murder
Assault with
Intent to
Commit
Murder
Robbery,
Armed

n = 331

x2 = 51.59268
p = .0000
gamma= -.17430

It was found that the majority of youths waived are aged 16, black,
and charged with either murder, assault with intent to commit murder, or
robbery, armed. Of those convicted, a surprising number are returned to
DSS. There was a significant relationship found between age and outcome
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and charge and outcome, yet both relationships were weak, indicating that
other factors are involved. In an attempt to discover and explain the
interaction between these variables and better explain the outcome, other
relationships between age, race, charge, and outcome were examined.
These analyses did not result in any significant findings, hence they will
not be reported.

CHAPTERV
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Introduction
Evident from the results presented earlier, there were a number of
expected and unexpected findings that appeared in the data analysis.
These findings will be reviewed below, and then related to the previously
stated research objectives. Following this will be a discussion of the
limitations of this research. In concluding, the implications of this
research will be presented.
Review of Findings
The use of waiver, in terms of the absolute number of youths
waived, varied over the years, reaching it highest point immediately
following the law's implementation. This is possibly due to the ease at
which waiver could be accomplished and the prosecutor's perception that
he or she should waive eligible youth in light of the law's implementation.
Prosecutorial use of the discretionary waiver then decreased and
remained rather constant for the remainder of the time period examined.
Youth aged 16 accounted for the majority of waivers, with there being no
significant variation among the individual offenses. This is consistent with
other findings, which have shown that the closer one is to the
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jurisdictional age limit of the juvenile court, the more likely waiver is to
occur (Champion, 1989).
The racial distribution of youths waived was expected, it being
similar to the overall racial distribution of the Wayne County Juvenile
Court. Prior research found that in the juvenile court,' 65.2% of the youths
in court records were black, and that the proportion of blacks increased as
the severity of the offense increased, with blacks consisting of 82.6% of
those charged with personal felonies (Bynum, Wordes, & Corley, 1993).
This is nearly identical to the percentage of blacks waived on Class lA
felonies (all of which are personal felonies, with the exception of
possession of 650 grams or more of a type 1 controlled substance, which
was not included in the preceding analysis). The distribution of youths
waived with respect to sex was quite different than what would be
expected in comparison to the juvenile court records. In the juvenile court,
16.1% of the youths charged with personal felonies were female, yet only
0.6% of the waiver population was female. While it is not known how
many of the females charged with personal felonies in the juvenile court
were in fact eligible for waiver, as the specific offense charged in the
juvenile court was unknown, the number of females waived is lower than
expected. On its surface, it appears that females are not considered as the
serious and chronic juvenile offenders for which the waiver law was
intended, and that, by implication, they are not responsible for serious
juvenile crime. However, such speculation must be considered carefully, as
the number of females that were eligible for waiver yet retained in the
juvenile court is unknown: it is possible, although unlikely, that there
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were in fact only two females eligible for waiver over the five year period
examined.
The three offenses that accounted for the majority of waivers were
murder, assault with intent to commit murder, and robbery, armed,
accounting for 87 .2% of all waivers. While all of the offenses that are
eligible for waiver are Class 1A felonies, punishable by up to life in prison,
these three offenses, murder, assault with intent to commit murder, and
robbery, armed, are arguably the most serious, and accordingly account
for the majority of waivers. The single most common offense for a waiver
of jurisdiction was a charge of murder, which represented 45.0% of all
waivers.
The distribution of waiver by outcome was not as expected, in that
only 26% of all youths waived were confined for a period longer than is
possible in DSS. As explained earlier, one of the objectives of this research
was to determine if, following waiver and conviction, youths were subject
to longer periods of incarceration than is possible in DSS. Possible
outcomes were then analyzed accordingly, with DSS and DOC 1-5 being
comparable in terms of length of confinement. As the previous analysis
has shown, 43.3% of the youths waived and convicted were sentenced to
DSS following conviction. Furthermore, 22.4% of the youths had their
cases dismissed or were found not guilty, and 8.4% were given probation
or sentenced to DOC 1-5 years. These outcomes combined account for
71.1 % of all cases of waiver. Of the 335 youths waived for which
sentencing data was available, 260 were convicted. Of these, 145 youths,
equating to 55.8% of those convicted, were returned to the juvenile justice
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system (DSS) for sentencing. Twenty-eight youths, 10.8% of those
convicted, were given sentences of DOC 1-5. The remaining 87 youths,
33.5% of those convicted, were given sentences in excess of five years.
Summary of Research Objectives
As listed in Chapter III, the goals of this research were to
determine the following: the conviction rate for youth tried in criminal
court following a discretionary waiver; the outcome following waiver and
conviction; and how the outcome varies with respect to age, race, sex, and
offense charged.
The conviction rate for juveniles charged with Class 1A felonies and
waived to the adult court was 77.6%. This includes those youths found not
guilty as well as those who had their cases dismissed. Of those youths
waived and tried, excluding those youths whose cases were dismissed,
11.3% were found not guilty, which equates to a conviction rate of 88. 7%
following a waiver of jurisdiction. Following waiver and conviction, a
surprisingly large number of youths, 55.8% of those for whom sentencing
data was available, were sentenced to DSS. As the waiver of jurisdiction
was intended to ensure harsher punishment for serious juvenile offenders,
the fact that over half of those waived were returned to the juvenile justice
system following conviction came as a surprise.
The outcome did vary by age, race and offense charged. With
respect to age, younger offenders were treated more leniently, _although
the relationship was weak, which indicates that other factors need to be
taken into account. This could possibly be explained by examining the
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prior records of youths waived, with younger offenders being treated more
leniently due to less extensive criminal records. With respect to race and
outcome, it was determined that, while there was no significant
relationship between race and outcome , non-blacks were more likely to be
sentenced to DSS and less likely to be sentenced to DOC 1-5. Blacks had a
three times greater chance of receiving DOC 1-5 than did their non-black
counterparts, and a lower probability of receiving an outcome of DSS.
Finally, the offense charged had a significant relationship on the outcome
of the case. A charge of murder was most likely to result in an outcome of
DOC 6-Life, and least likely to result in an outcome of DSS. For all other
offenses, approximately half of the youths charged and convicted received
outcomes of DSS, and only a small number received outcomes more severe
than is possible if they had not been waived. Similar to the relationship of
age and outcome however, the relationship between offense charged and
outcome was weak, indicating that there are other factors involved in
addition to those examined.
Limitations
There are some limitations of this research which must be taken
into account, due to the actual data that were collected and specific
characteristics of the area where the data were collected. First, the
researcher was unable to obtain any information on the prior record of
individual youths or characteristics of the various offenses charged, both
of which might offer an explanation as to why a surprising number of
youths were returned to DSS upon conviction. The prior record of youths

waived could very well help explain the disparities in sentences that
appear to exist: it is possible that those youths sentenced to DSS following
conviction had no significant criminal record, whereas those youths
sentenced to DOC had a lengthy or repetitive criminal history. Also of
importance are characteristics of the offense, including but not limited to:
the number and age of victim(s), the use of a weapon or the type of weapon
used, the nature and extent of injury to the victim (physical, emotional, or
monetary), and other offenses charged. Finally, it in unknown how the
outcomes of each case varied among different trial judges, be it a bench or
jury trial, and among different sentencing judges. There are numerous
judges hearing waiver cases in Wayne County, and there exist both bench
and jury trials for youths subject to waiver. Furthermore, often times a
different judge was used at sentencing than at trial. All of these
aforementioned factors may account for some of the variation in individual
waiver cases.
The second limitation is that the Recorder's Court is located in
Wayne County, Michigan, in the heart of Detroit, Michigan. Detroit is the
largest metropolitan area in Michigan, and by virtue of this, different than
any other county or geographic area in Michigan. For this reason, the use
of waiver may be noticeably different than in other areas of the state, both
with respect to the youths waived and the outcome of the trial. For
example, a youth charged with robbery, armed and waived to adult court
in Detroit will be viewed differently than a similar case in a small rural
area. In a rural area, there may only be one robbery, armed charge per
year, with the result being the filing of a waiver motion, whereas in
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Detroit, youths with a charge of robbery, armed are more commonplace,
and not all youths with such charges are in fact waived. For this reason,
generalizing the findings of this research, in regards to waiver use in the
Recorder's Court, to locations outside of Wayne County should be done
with caution.
Implications
After the Juvenile Waiver Package was passed by the Michigan
Legislature in 1988, it was thought by many, notably critics of the judicial
waiver, to be the appropriate response to serious juvenile crime. By
allowing the prosecutor to waive juveniles meeting specific age and offense
requirements, without first-having to gain judicial support, more youths
could be waived, with greater ease, with this in theory having an impact
on serious juvenile crime. What could not have been anticipated was that
the majority of these youths would only be returned to the juvenile justice
system after conviction, the very system that they were removed from
based on the seriousness of the offense they were alleged to have
committed.
There is an apparent discrepancy with respect to who should
determine the court of jurisdiction for juveniles charged with Class 1A
felonies. The prosecutor is waiving to the adult court a large number of
youths who (s)he feels should be tried in the adult court. Yet upon
conviction, the judge is returning these same youths to the juvenile justice
system to serve their sentences. In not sentencing these juveniles to the
Department of Corrections, opting instead for the Department of Social
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Services, the judge is essentially sending the message that (s)he would not
have waived these same youths if originally given the opportunity to
determine the judicial forum. It is here that the discrepancy lies: the
prosecutor feels that a waiver of jurisdiction is necessary, while the judge
holds that a large number of these same youths are better suited for the
juvenile justice system.
The question now arises regarding who should have the power to
determine the court of jurisdiction for serious juvenile offenders. In
answering this question, there are several factors that must be considered.
First, the prosecutor, in deciding jurisdiction, is only bound by law to
consider the age of the offender and the offense charged. If (s)he finds that
the accused is aged 15 or 16, and allegedly committed a Class 1A felony,
the youth can be waived automatically. The prosecutor is not bound to
consider any of the criteria resultant from the Kent decision when
deciding the court of jurisdiction, nor is the youth in question guaranteed
any due process rights. Judges on the other hand, are bound by law to
make the decision granting or denying waiver only after a hearing in
which juveniles are guaranteed their due process rights and in which Kent
criteria are considered.
Second, it was found by Bishop and Frazier (1989) that the ease at
which waiver was accomplished alone contributed to its use. That is, the
easier it is for prosecutors to waive eligible youths, the greater the ·
likelihood of a subsequent waiver. This results in a large number of
youths waived to the adult court via the prosecutor who, had the waiver
motion not been as effortless, would still be in the juvenile court.
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Supporting this notion, that the prosecutor is waiving to the adult court a
number of youths still fit for the juvenile court, are the results of this
study, in that over half of the youths waived and convicted were returned
:.

to the juvenile justice system. The alternative, the judicial waiver/is more
cumbersome, in that there is a trial to determine jurisdiction, with this
alone serving as a possible deterrent for motions of waiver that are
unlikely to be granted.
A third factor to consider is one of bias. In an adversarial system of
criminal justice, the prosecutor is only one side of the equation. In this
role, (s)he represents the state, and is interested in a conviction, not in
being a neutral arbiter or in defending the accused. Accordingly, the
prosecutor, because of legal position, is biased. The judge on the other
hand, is in theory intended to be the neutral arbiter, examining all sides
of the issue at hand and making a decision from this neutral, objective
standpoint. In this position, the judge is potentially free from any bias
that may exist with respect to whether or not a youth should be waived.·
The final factor to consider is political pressure. In Michigan, both
the prosecuting attorney and the judge are public figures, and dependent
upon the general public for their job security and re-election. Naturally,
they will react to public pressure and criticism in the performance of their
jobs. However, the prosecutor is more likely to be affected by such
pressure, simply by the public's perception of his or her duty: the
prosecutor is to represent the state in securing a conviction, whereas the
judge represents the state in a neutral manner, serving as an arbiter
between the prosecution and the defense.
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Whether the judge or the prosecutor is better suited for determining
the judicial forum has been the subject of debate. Yet, faced with the
option of either a prosecutorial or judicial waiver, it is the researcher's
belief that this decision is better left to a judge, after a full hearing in
which due process rights are afforded and Kent criteria are considered.
This is consistent with previous research: Bishop and Frazier (1989), after
examining the use of prosecutorial waiver in Florida, stated that the
decision to waive is best left to a judge, using Kent criteria. Also, in
making a decision between the two, Mlyniec (1976) stated that a judicial
review of the decision to waive should be mandatory in all instances, in
order to preserve the guaranteed due process rights of juveniles.
A second question that arises is whether there is any utility or
practical value in the Michigan Juvenile Waiver Package, or if it is just
symbolic of the general public's desire to get tough on crime and criminals.
As Bortner (1986) stated after examining the use of waiver, it appears to
be more of a "public placating safety valve" rather than an actual solution
to the problem of serious juvenile crime. To answer this question, it is
necessary to distinguish between the instrumental and symbolic functions
of law.
Gusfield (1967) makes a distinction between the instrumental and
symbolic functions of law, and how this in turn affects behavior. The
instrumental function of a law is dependent on the law's enforcement and
it's subsequent effect on behavior, whereas the symbolic function is an end
in itself, there being less importance attached to its actual impact or
effect. Continuing, he states that "law can thus be seen as symbolizing the
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public affirmation of social ideals and norms as well as a means of direct
social control", and that the symbolic significance of a law lies only in its
affirmation, i.e., its being carried into effect, not in its implementation,
i.e., its effect on behavior (Gusfield, 1967: p. 86).
With respect to the waiver of jurisdiction, the instrumental effect of
the law would be the waiver of juveniles and their subsequent conviction
and incarceration for longer periods than are possible in the juvenile
justice system. The symbolic effect of the law, however, is not dependent
on its enforcement, and is already realized simply by its being put into
effect. The public has sent a message of being tough on juvenile offenders,
with the goal of reducing the amount of serious juvenile crime. Whether or
not the waiver law realize·s any instrumental effect is unimportant, as
society's norms and values have been affirmed by the passing of this law.
As this research has shown, the prosecutorial waiver method in Michigan
is not realizing its intended goal of harsher punishment for serious
juvenile offenders, it's instrumental effect, as over half of those waived
and convicted are returned to the juvenile justice system. While the
waiver law has not had an instrumental effect, it has realized its symbolic
effect, in that society has affirmed and stated its position with respect to
such serious juvenile offenders.
There still remain several unanswered questions which need to be
addressed in future research. First and foremost are the long term
consequences of waiver. Clearly the majority of juveniles waived and
convicted will eventually return to the community, which raises the
question of what should be done with these offenders in the meantime. If a
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15 or 16 year old youth is going to be incarcerated for a period of time and
then returned to the community, should (s)he be housed with juvenile
offenders under a philosophy of rehabilitation, or with adult offenders
under a philosophy of retribution or incapacitation? Related to this issue
is the question of whether or not the criminal justice system has the
facilities and programs for individuals who are subject to waiver and
convicted. Can the Department of Corrections feasibly deal with an influx
, of individuals who are essentially children, provide the support that is
needed for them, and at the same time serve the needs of other
individuals who are incarcerated? Future research is needed to assess the
impact of waiver on the Department of Corrections, and the long term
effects of a waiver to the adult court.
Conclusion
At its inception in Cook County, Illinois, in 1899, the juvenile court
operated under two basic principles, parens patriae and individualized
justice. Over time, however, the juvenile court has come to resemble more
and more the adult court. The best interests of the child are no longer of
primary concern, these having been replaced with, in regards to waiver,
the protection of the public by identifying the dangerous and intractable.
Treating a youth aged 15 or 16 as an adult, however, is not the answer to
the question of what should be done about serious juvenile crime. Except
in a court of law, an individual does not go to bed a child and wake up an
adult. Rather, youths are constantly maturing, becoming adults over time,
not over night. Detennining if a youth is an adult cannot be done by only

examining age and offense, as there are a host of other factors, including
emotional, physical, and intellectual maturity, that are involved. As all of
these factors need to be examined in determining the court of jurisdiction,
such a decision should occur only after a hearing in which the juvenile is
afforded his due process rights and Kent criteria are considered.
The findings of this study, in that the majority of youths waived via
the prosecutorial waiver method in Wayne County, Michigan were
returned to the juvenile justice system following conviction, also suggests
that the law is merely symbolic. By simply implementing the waiver law,
the public's desire to get tough on crime and criminals, and feel good about
themselves in doing just that, was affirmed, without there ever having to
be any real effect as a result of the law. The Michigan Juvenile Waiver
Package, which allows prosecutors to waive to the adult court select
juveniles accused of violent crimes, is a "feel good" law, symbolic of the
public's desire to "get tough" on crime, with there being no dramatic
change in the treatment of serious and violent juvenile offenders as a
result of the prosecutorial waiver.
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Appendix A
Protocol Clearance From the Human Subjects
Institutional Review Board
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